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Abstract 
 
The rise of academic entrepreneurialism with its emphasis on industrial engagement is re-
shaping the ‘master-apprentice’ relationship between professors and young scientists. This study 
uses the lens of social exchange to examine this relationship, and how it affects young scientists’ 
psychological contracts and how they adapt their careers in consequence. The study distinguishes 
two categories of industrial engagement, collaborative research and commercial ventures, with 
the former governed by ‘relational’ and the latter, ‘transactional’ exchange. A novel finding is 
the divergent responses of young scientists to unmet career expectations. Those engaged in 
collaborative research responded by extended investment in their current jobs. They are ‘trapped 
postdocs’ in perennial temporary employment: ‘content to be sad’. By contrast, those involved in 
commercialization responded by career crafting. They are ‘runaway apprentices’ who seek 
autonomy by developing their own entrepreneurial careers. The entrepreneurial university 
hinders the upward mobility of young scientists but it also offers them scope to redefine their 
work and careers.  The study contributes to the psychological contract literature by highlighting 
the agency role of young scientists in shaping their own careers. The evidence is based on 
individual interviews with 24 doctoral students/post-docs and 16 professors from three leading 
UK research universities. 
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Introduction 
 
The arrival of the entrepreneurial university has dramatically reshaped academic scientific work 
over the past two decades (Clark, 1998; Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). Central to its mission is the 
development of an organizational capability to translate research results into economic utility by 
forging close links with industrial firms, and the dual roles of academics as scientist-
entrepreneurs. While much has been written about the role of ‘entrepreneurial’ professors 
(Etzkowitz, 2003; Lam, 2010), less is known about the growing number of doctoral and 
postdoctoral researchers who perform the bulk of bench research and comprise a central 
component of professors’ scientific human capital (Bozeman and Corley, 2004). These young 
scientists, with their short-tenure and complementary research skills, provide a flexible 
workforce for the academic laboratories and help to enhance their professors’ capacity to 
respond to opportunities for external funding and commercialization. This study uses the lens of 
social exchange (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) and psychological contract theory (Robinson et al., 
1994; Rousseau, 1995) to examine the relationship between professors and young scientists 
engaged in industrial links, and its effects on the training and career experience of the latter. It 
focuses on academics in the natural sciences where entrepreneurialism is most fully developed. 
Scientific training and career formation are embedded in a ‘master-apprentice’ relationship 
between professors and junior scientists. Professors, as teachers, mentors and collaborators, play 
a pivotal role in shaping the skills and early careers of junior scientists (Reskin, 1979; Long and 
McGinnis, 1985). Industrial engagement may alter the relationship between the two parties and 
transform young scientists from ‘apprentice learners’ to ‘research workers’ or even ‘business 
partners’ in commercial ventures. Some authors contend that early career scientists are prone to 
be exploited as low cost labour in the exchange relationship between university and private 
business at the expense of their training and career prospects in an increasingly precarious 
academic labour market (Slaughter et al., 2002; Harney et al., 2011).  This pessimistic view is 
aligned with the fact that increasing numbers of post-doctoral researchers have become trapped 
in a sequence of temporary contracts (Laudel and Gläser, 2008). Industrial engagement may 
restrict intellectual development which could further diminish their chances of obtaining 
permanent academic positions (Robin and Cahuzac, 2003).  Other studies suggest more 
optimistically that university-industry collaboration can bring new and varied forms of training 
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to young scientists, and enhance their employability beyond academia (Enders and Weert, 2004; 
Dany and Mangematin, 2004).  
However, both arguments have neglected the diverse patterns of industrial engagement and 
how young scientists may respond differently to the career risks and opportunities entailed. This 
study distinguishes two broad categories of industrial engagement: collaborative research and 
commercialization. They entail different exchange relationships between professors as focal 
links and young scientists as bench researchers. They also provide different learning 
opportunities to the young scientists involved and incur different levels of scientific and career 
risks. Collaborative research is an open-science channel of industrial engagement governed by 
scientific norms and relational exchange. Involvement of young scientists will not necessarily 
compromise the mentoring role of professors although prolonged engagement in a support role 
may hamper their scientific development. In contrast, commercial research is governed by the 
norm of proprietary science with the aim of generating specific outputs which can be 
appropriated for financial returns. It adds a transactional element to the master-apprentice 
relationship and can undermine trust between them. It exposes young researchers to greater 
scientific career risks, while also providing opportunities for entrepreneurial learning (Azoulay et 
al., 2009). 
An exchange relationship is underpinned by a psychological contract which is an implicit 
understanding of mutual obligations between two parties in a relationship (Rousseau, 1995). 
Mutual obligations are central to the collaborative relationship between professors and young 
scientists in academic research and training (Wade-Benzoni et al., 2006). In physical and 
experimental sciences, professors are heavily dependent on junior scientists to do the laboratory 
bench work.  In return for research assistance, professors help the intellectual development of 
young scientists and provide career support. Young scientists who progress from doctoral to 
postdoctoral research usually see the position as a bridge towards a permanent academic post. 
The academic career promise looms large in their psychological contracts. In the past, the 
majority could expect to obtain permanent posts after one or two temporary contracts. However, 
with the emergence of ‘steady state science’ since the early 1990s (Ziman, 1994), many have 
been caught between the squeeze of increased supply and declining job opportunities (Stephan 
and Ma, 2005).1  It has become increasingly difficult for professors to reward the cooperative 
efforts of young scientists by offering them long-term academic posts.  Industrial engagement 
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can deepen the crisis in career expectations. These trends are likely to have profound effects on 
the psychological contracts of young scientists with many experiencing the frustration of 
unfulfilled expectations. 
The study compares the career experience of young scientists engaged in collaborative 
research and commercial ventures and the shifts in their psychological contracts as they make the 
transition from student-learner to postdoctoral researcher. It examines how they adapt to career 
uncertainty and unmet expectations. The empirical evidence is based on individual interviews 
with 40 academic scientists, comprising matched pairs of doctoral students/post-docs (24) and 
their professors (16) from three leading U.K. research universities.  A novel finding is the 
divergent responses of young scientists to unmet career expectations. In contrast to mainstream 
psychological contract theory which stresses the ‘scaling down’ of individual contribution and 
withdrawal behaviour among those who experience unfulfilled expectations or psychological 
contract breach, we find that young scientists engaged in collaborative research responded by 
‘scaling up’ their contributions through ‘extended investment’ in current jobs and relationships 
(van Dam, 2005), whereas those involved in commercialization craft their jobs and careers 
(Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001; King, 2004) by drawing resources from existing relationships. 
The former are the ‘trapped’ postdocs who cannot escape from perennial temporary employment 
but are ‘content to be sad’, to use a quote from the interviews; whereas the latter are the 
‘runaway apprentices’2 who seek independence from their ‘masters’ by developing their own 
entrepreneurial careers. The study contributes to the psychological contract literature by 
highlighting the agency role of young scientists in shaping their own careers. It also sheds new 
light on the debate about the changing nature of academic careers in an environment where the 
previously separate organizational fields of science and business increasingly overlap. It argues 
that the entrepreneurial university hinders the upward mobility of young scientists, but also 
offers them scope to redefine their work and careers at the blurred boundary between academia 
and industry.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops the conceptual framework 
guiding the study. Section three describes the research methods and interview sample. Section 
four analyses the dynamics of the relationships between professors and young scientists engaged 
in collaborative research and commercial ventures. It looks at how young scientists’ 
psychological contracts evolve over time and their divergent responses to unmet career 
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expectations. Section five examines the effects of the two types of activities on their subsequent 
career trajectories. The paper ends by discussing the theoretical significance and wider 
implications of the study. 
 
The conceptual framework: Social exchange and the psychological contract 
 
Modes of industrial engagement and exchange relationships: Collaborative vs. commercial 
 
Social exchange refers to actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others (Blau 
1964). Exchange can be governed by different principles or norms which influence the nature of 
interaction, flow of resources and how actors use power and respond to risk (Emerson 1976). 
Typically, a distinction is made between relational and transactional forms of exchange. While 
relational exchange is governed by reciprocity rules in an open-ended, long-term exchange 
relationship, transactional exchange involves a short-term, more specific form of exchange 
governed by negotiated rules. Resources that are highly particularistic and symbolic (e.g. socio-
emotional support and status) are more likely to be exchanged in a relational manner whereas 
universal and tangible resources (e.g. money and labour) are often exchanged in a more explicit 
fashion through negotiation (Foa and Foa, 1980).  Reciprocal exchange allows actors to be more 
trusting of one another and encourages cooperation (Gouldner, 1960). By contrast, negotiated 
arrangements tend to be more quid-pro-quo, and are likely to incite  unhelpful power use as 
actors seek to negotiate better terms and reduce risks (Molm et al., 1999).  
Exchange is a dyadic relationship but is subject to the influence and control of the collective. 
Uehara (1990) distinguishes between diffuse and restricted exchange, with the former being 
subject to a higher degree of collective control and the latter being more dyadically-based. 
According to Uehara, diffuse exchange engenders a higher degree of solidarity because actors 
place trust in the collective to exert control over individual exchange. Thus, individuals can be 
more relaxed and leave the particulars of the return unspecified at the time of the exchange. By 
contrast, restricted exchange is characterised by a higher degree of accountability in each 
partner’s behaviour and partners are more inclined to maintain equity in exchange rates between 
them within a short period of time. As a result, conflict over fairness of the exchange frequently 
occurs and actors may become distrustful of each other.  
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In this study, we postulate that the norms and structures of exchange governing the 
relationship between professors and young scientists differ between collaborative research and 
commercial ventures. Collaborative research is governed by an established academic framework 
and scientific norms of exchange.  Its primary goal is to produce outputs that are of industrial 
relevance but which can be adapted for publications by the researchers involved.  It is a 
relational-based, diffuse exchange relationship which builds on the flow of knowledge resources 
between the parties involved. In most cases, private firms engage in collaborative research with 
academic researchers in order to gain access to evolving new knowledge.  Academics are usually 
given a high degree of autonomy in conducting the research. Involvement of young scientists 
will not necessarily undermine the teaching/mentoring role of professors especially if the 
collaboration forms an integral part of their scientific training (Bozeman and Corley 2004). On 
the contrary, the provision of funding resources and the role of professors in brokering the 
relationship with industrial sponsors (Salminen-Karlsson and Wallgren, 2008) may serve to 
reinforce the mentoring exchange and generate a cooperative dynamic in the relationship. 
Commercial research, by contrast, is governed by the norm of proprietary science with the 
aim of generating specific outputs which can be appropriated for financial gains.  Industrial 
sponsors often exert a direct influence on the research conducted and may restrict the 
opportunities for open dissemination and publication. The exchange relationship is more 
restricted and it involves the flow of financial resources in addition to knowledge. Commercial 
engagement adds a transactional element to the master-apprentice relationship between 
professors and young scientists. It also entails more complex role relationships between them 
(MacDonald and Williams-Jones, 2009). The role of the professor as business 
person/entrepreneur may not be compatible with that of teacher/mentor. Serious conflicts of 
interest may occur when students/researchers are employed to work in a spin-off company 
formed by a professor. In research commercialization, disputes over ownership of intellectual 
property and distribution of benefits are not uncommon (Mars et al., 2008). Further, unlike 
collaborative research where the relationship between the two parties is governed by academic 
norms, the interface between them in commercial ventures occurs at the boundary of science and 
business, moving away from the safeguards of peer sanction. The exchange relationship in 
commercial ventures is more dyadically-based and prone to tension.   
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Molm et al (1999) argue that power use will be greater when exchange is negotiated than 
when it is reciprocal. This is because efforts to negotiate better terms and reduce risks incite the 
use of power by actors. The mutual dependency between professors and young researchers 
provides the structural basis for their power over each other where the less dependent partner, the 
professor, has a structural power advantage (Emerson, 1962). This structural potential is more 
likely to become manifest in commercial than in collaborative research. Commercial 
engagement, therefore, has greater potential to undermine trust between young scientists and 
professors, and create a conflict dynamic in the relationship.   
 
Mutual obligations and the psychological contract: From training to work 
 
The relationship between young scientists and professors builds on the collaborative projects 
undertaken, and entails mutual promises and obligations made and accepted by the parties. How 
each party perceives these obligations and the mutual expectations regarding the terms of the 
exchange relationship can be conceptualised as the psychological contract (Rousseau 1995). 
Researchers have emphasised that psychological contracts are held by employees (Morrison and 
Robinson, 1997). In this paper, the concept is employed to examine the perceptions and 
expectations of young scientists regarding training and career development in their exchange 
relationships with the professors.  
Psychological contracts can take different forms. A common approach is to distinguish 
between psychological contracts that are largely relational in nature and those that are largely 
transactional (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau, 2000).  A ‘relational’ contract entails broad, open-
ended obligations which involve the exchange of not only monetizable elements, but also 
socioemotional elements such as loyalty and support. A transactional contract is composed of 
specific and monetizable obligations entailing limited involvement of the parties. In between 
these two polar types, ‘balanced’ and ‘transitional’ psychological contracts are also possible.  A 
balanced psychological contract is characterised by an open-ended relationship with specific 
obligations that are subject to change over time.  A ‘transitional’ psychological contract is 
characterised by uncertainty and an eroding exchange relationship. Previous research suggests 
that ‘relational’ and ‘balanced’ psychological contracts offer higher degree of stability (Lester et 
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al., 2007).  ‘Transitional’ and ‘transactional’ psychological contracts, on the other hand, are less 
stable and more prone to tension.  
Young scientists may be involved in industrial projects as part of their formal scientific 
training or employed as researchers to work on their professors’ research programmes which 
may or may not be directly related to their training.  The psychological contracts governing 
training and employment are not the same. In a training context, the mutual obligations between 
professors and young researchers are loosely specified in an open, mentoring exchange. Doctoral 
students and junior researchers are at the beginning of their research career and may not have 
clear career projects in mind. For these young scientists, the experience of a fulfilling learning 
process and acquisition of knowledge and skills that are useful to future careers are central to 
their psychological contracts (Bordia et al., 2010). They are critically dependent on their 
professors for academic guidance and collaborative opportunities.  While there is considerable 
scope for professors to exercise judgement and influence on the training of students/learners, the 
scope for young scientists to influence the terms of the exchange relationship is relatively 
limited. Moreover, given the imbalance of knowledge and power between the two parties, the 
expectations for exchange symmetry may also be low. The psychological contract is a nascent 
one, developing but not fully formed.  
In an employment relationship, the interface between the two parties is governed by 
contractual arrangements with greater clarity of mutual obligations centred around specific 
research tasks.  It builds on a more developed psychological contract with greater scope for 
individual negotiation.  Professors, as principal investigators and laboratory managers, are the 
primary contract makers responsible for overseeing the performance and career development of 
postdocs.  Postdocs, as contract researchers/employees, are agents engaged to perform research 
tasks in support of their professors’ research programmes.  However, the employment 
relationship between professors and postdocs differs from the standard one because postdocs are 
apprentice-employees and have greater expectations than other contracts of employment. The 
postdoc period is a crucial transitional phase during which young scientists are expected to gain 
independence to become fully-fledged academic researchers. They are intensely dependent on 
their professors for research collaboration, joint publications and career support in return for their 
cooperative efforts.   
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The employment relationship between professors and postdocs is riddled with conflicting 
obligations. Industrial engagement increases the degree of mutual obligations between them, and 
may further strengthen the postdocs’ psychological contract and expectations of career support. 
Professors with intense industrial engagement often suffer from a ‘time squeeze’ problem and 
are heavily dependent on postdocs to conduct research and provide various support. They have 
strong incentives to retain the experienced researchers and may be tempted to maintain the 
apprentice-employee relationship long after the initial training period (Freeman et al., 2001). As 
principal investigators and employers, professors are accountable to external funders and may 
coerce young scientists to work on projects not directly related to their research interest. Young 
scientists may also be under pressure to adapt to the research preferences of their professors with 
the expectation of reciprocation in career terms. Psychological contract theory suggests that an 
employee’s behaviour is influenced not only by actual fulfilment of promises made by the 
employer but also the anticipation of fulfilled promises and future benefits (Coyle-Shapiro, 
2002). Industrial engagement may result in a mutual high obligation relationship between 
professors and postdocs. However, it can also make the fulfilment of the perceived career 
promise more difficult because prolonged industrial engagement may inhibit young scientists’ 
ability to build up a track record of research.   
Many of these young scientists are likely to find their career expectations unfulfilled. How 
might this change the dynamics of the relationships and how might young scientists respond?  
 
Unmet career expectations and adaptive responses: Reactive/compromise vs. proactive/control 
response  
 
Reciprocal contributions for mutual benefits are the core of functional exchange relationships 
and constructive psychological contracts (Rousseau 1995).  Unmet career expectations can be 
seen as psychological contract breach and change the dynamics of the exchange relationships 
(Morrison and Robinson, 1997).  According to Robinson et al (1994), employees’ can potentially 
alter their expectations in either the relational or transactional direction and may react differently 
to unmet expectations.  A relational pattern of change may lead to an escalation of commitment 
between parties to the exchange. In relational exchange, the norm of reciprocity is likely to 
increase the number and diversity of obligations in the exchange relationships. As relationships 
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mature and trust develops, individuals strive to create a positive balance in their relationships to 
avoid becoming indebted to the other party (Blau 1964). This may lead to increased mutual 
dependency over time, making it difficult, if not impossible, to break the relationship. Unmet 
expectations, in this context, can cause tension and disappointment but may not lead to a 
breakdown of the relationship. Employees may also experience an instrumental shift in their 
psychological contracts which is likely to occur when they believe that their contributions 
outweigh those of their employers’ and perceive unfairness in the exchange. Unmet expectations 
are more likely to be perceived as psychological violation in an instrumental relationship, and 
may cause conflict and generate intense reactions.  
Psychological contract theory has provided rich insights into the effects of unfulfilled 
expectations and psychological contract breach on the attitudes and behaviours of employees. 
The existing literature, however, has emphasised their negative responses in terms of reduced 
organizational commitment, poor job performance and turnover (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 
2000; Robinson, 1996; Turnley and Feldman, 1999). The role of employees as active parties to 
the psychological contracts and how they might influence the exchange relationships and shape 
their own careers have largely been overlooked. Seeck and Parzefall (2008) argue that employees 
are capable of exercising agency in defining their obligations and roles rather than simply 
reciprocating by reacting to their employers’ exchanged behaviours. The literature on career self-
management also stresses the proactivity of employees in managing their careers and the 
concrete actions which they undertake to realise their career goals (De Vos and Soens, 2008; 
King, 2004). These actions can focus on either improving one’s current position within the 
organization or furthering career opportunities elsewhere. 
In this study, we argue that young scientists are active parties to the psychological contract 
and may adopt different strategies for coping with unmet expectations. Two contrasting 
responses can be identified in the literature: a reactive/compromise response through extended 
investment in current jobs and relationships (van Dam, 2005), and a proactive/control response 
through job and career crafting (Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001; King, 2004). Existing research 
suggests that the characteristics of an exchange relationship, employees’ degree of attachment to 
current jobs and perceived alternative career options are factors that may influence their adaptive 
responses (Johnson and O'Leary-Kelly, 2003; Sturges et al., 2005). Individuals who have 
developed strong commitment to current jobs, and experienced relational psychological contracts 
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are likely to adopt a compromise response (Meyer et al., 2002). A proactive/control response, by 
contrast, is more likely to occur among those who experience a transactional psychological 
contract and perceive unmet expectations as contract breach. Previous research suggests that 
psychological breach reduces individuals’ commitment to the organization (Conway et al., 2011) 
and is strongly associated with intention to quit and actual turnover (Robinson, 1996; Robinson 
and Rousseau, 1994). As a result, individuals are more inclined to engage in externally-oriented 
career self-management activities with the aim of furthering their careers elsewhere. 
We expect young scientists engaged in collaborative research and commercial ventures to 
respond differently to unfulfilled expectations due to the divergent norms and structures 
governing the exchange relationships with their professors and, the different learning 
opportunities and scientific career risks associated with the two types of activities. We postulate 
that young scientists involved in collaborative research may experience a relational shift in their 
psychological contracts and adopt a compromise approach in the face of unmet expectations. By 
contrast, those who have extensive involvement in commercial projects may experience an 
instrumental turn in their psychological contracts and respond to unfulfilled career promises in a 
more proactive manner. 
 
Research methods and data 
 
Individual interviews were conducted with 40 academic scientists from three major UK research 
universities. The disciplines covered include biological sciences, computer science and 
engineering, and physical sciences where academic entrepreneurialism has been most actively 
pursued. Data on the career histories of young scientists were also obtained from individual CVs 
and web searches. The interview sample consists of 24 doctoral students/postdocs and 16 
professors of whom 13 were supervisors of these young scientists. Given that the study focuses 
on exchange relationships, a dyadic perspective analysing the views of both parties is essential 
(Thompson and Walker, 1982). We conducted individual interviews, where possible, with 
matched pairs of professors-students/researchers. In some cases, we interviewed more than one 
researcher linked to the same professor.  Out of the 24 students/postdocs, it was possible to 
interview the corresponding professors in 20 cases and in the other 4 cases, the professors were 
not available for the interview. The professors were identified mainly through searches on the 
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universities’ websites and the researchers were identified either from the interviews with the 
professors or through web searches. A snowball method was also used to obtain additional 
names. 
 The interviews with the students/postdocs focused on their work roles and research activities, 
work relationships in the laboratories, involvement in their professors’ industrial links, learning 
experience, career expectations/preferences and perceived future prospects. For the professors, 
we obtained information about their industrial activities and asked detailed questions about 
funding sponsorships for students/postdocs, the role of these young scientists in their 
laboratories, and evaluation of the influence of industrial engagement on their role as 
mentors/supervisors. All the professors interviewed had extensive industrial links ranging from 
traditional modes of collaboration (collaborative research and student sponsorships) to direct 
involvement in commercialization (patenting and spin-off company formation).  Among the 16 
professors interviewed, 5 were involved in collaborative links only and 11 were engaged in both 
collaborative and commercial activities. Each interview lasted for about 75-90 minutes and all 
were recorded and transcribed. 
 The young scientists studied include doctoral students, junior postdocs in their first or second 
employment contracts and senior postdocs who have had more than 10 years of employment as 
temporary researchers.  The sample composition enables us to analyse the experience of the 
young scientists at different stages of their careers.  It introduces a temporal dimension to the 
data which is needed for understanding the evolving relationships with their professors and how 
accumulated experience affects their psychological contracts.  A longitudinal component of the 
study is also facilitated by using the retrospective accounts of the individuals’ career histories 
based on the interviews and CVs, and subsequent tracking of the young scientists’ career moves 
based on web searches.  The CV provides a rich source of longitudinal data on an academic 
researcher’s graduate education, timing, sequence and duration of jobs and positions as well as 
collaborative patterns (Dietz et al., 2000). The interviews were conducted during 2006-07 and we 
tracked the careers of the young scientists up until early 2012.  We were able to track the career 
moves/destinations of all the young scientists interviewed. 
 Table 1 shows the number of interviewees by position and modes of industrial engagement. 
Table 2 outlines the profiles of the 24 students/postdocs and the industrial activities of the 
corresponding professors. 
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Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
Young scientists in collaborative research and commercial engagement: Relationships with 
professors and the psychological contract 
 
The analysis classifies the young scientists into four categories based on the modes of industrial 
engagement (collaborative vs. commercial) and nature of involvement (training vs. 
employment).3  The ‘learner apprentices’ (8 cases) are the doctoral students/ junior postdocs 
involved in collaborative research as part of their scientific training. The ‘extended apprentices’ 
(7 cases) are the senior postdocs engaged in collaborative projects who had been working as 
contract researchers for the duration ranging from 10 to 23 years. The ‘exploited apprentices’ (5 
cases) are the doctoral students/junior postdocs conducting research in their professors’ 
commercial laboratories which may, or may not, be directly related to their research training. 
The term ‘exploited apprentice’ is used to denote their vulnerability to intellectual and labour 
exploitation.  The ‘runaway apprentices’ (4 cases) refer to the senior postdocs who had extensive 
involvement in their professors’ commercial activities but subsequently sought to break away 
from the relationship.  
The analysis shows that those engaged in collaborative research held a ‘relational’ 
psychological contract while they were ‘learner apprentices’ but this evolved over time into a 
‘transitional’ one experienced by the ‘extended apprentices’ who faced growing career 
uncertainty.  The ‘exploited apprentices’ displayed a ‘balanced’ psychological contract but 
perceived unequal exchange eventually caused a ‘transactional’ turn in the psychological 
contract among the ‘runaway apprentices’.  Figure one shows the positions of the four categories.  
 
The ‘learner apprentice’ in collaborative research 
 
Reciprocal dependence   The relationship between the professors and learner apprentices is close 
to the traditional ‘master-apprentice’ model of reciprocal exchange where the flow of knowledge 
and provision of socio-emotional support creates a social bond between them.   However, unlike 
the traditional academic model, the interface between the two parties took place within a more 
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open academic environment with the presence of industrial partners as funders and sources of 
additional knowledge inputs.  
The professors usually acted as buffers between the students/researchers and the firms. They 
played a key role as ‘strategic brokers’ in liaising the research goals with firms, and dealing with 
the formal contractual aspects of the collaboration. Most of the professors were experienced in 
collaborating with industry and sought to balance scientific goals with industrial relevance. One 
professor, who headed a collaborative research centre, for example, stated that the agreement 
with the industrial funder rested on ‘what is called two colours.  One is freedom of academic 
research and the other is alignment of our research with Company Y...’ (Professor G). Others 
pointed out that they would avoid any conflict of interest by maintaining a clear boundary 
between ‘private’ and ‘public’ work, and ensured that the educational goals were not 
compromised especially when doctoral students were involved. 
The analysis suggests that professors with extensive industrial links and external funding 
were often regarded as ‘strong mentors’ by their students/researchers. Their laboratories are 
usually well-funded and they are in a position to provide funding support and collaborative 
opportunities to the students/researchers. The learner apprentices reported positive work 
relationships with their professors and saw their professors’ scientific reputation and wide 
network of contacts as important assets for their learning and future careers: 
 
‘I am very lucky to be working with Professor L... he is very experienced and he is 
internationally renowned in this area. And he has a lot of funding which means our labs are 
quite well-equipped, so we have a lot of learning opportunity’ (case 8). 
 
‘I think Prof X is a very effective academic... He has been extremely good at producing 
opportunities for me, first of all he has been very good at getting me the money to do this 
PhD. And he has got me involved with this project work… who  knows he might create more 
opportunities for me in the future in terms of helping me to secure a permanent position on 
my PhD’ (case 3; emphasis added). 
 
Relational psychological contract   While the ‘learner apprentices’ are the dependent partners in 
the exchange relationship, they are not merely passive recipients of their professors’ mentoring 
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support. In return for sponsorships, they provide research assistance and help to cement network 
ties with firms.  One of the professors described the links between his doctoral students and 
industrial networks as a kind of ‘food chain’ because many of his industrial contacts were his 
former students.  Thus, in the truest sense of an exchange relationship, both the professors and 
learner apprentices are dependent on each other for valued resources and engaged in enactment 
of mutually beneficial support behaviour. The learner apprentices displayed flexible attitudes 
towards future career options and were generally optimistic about employment prospects. Some 
believed that the collaborative experience could enhance their careers, in either academia or 
industry.  
 
The ‘extended apprentice’ in collaborative research 
 
For those who aspire to an academic career and continue as postdocs for an extended period, the 
relationship with the professors evolves from reciprocal dependence to reciprocal 
interdependence as trust develops and as they take on more duties in the laboratories. However, 
the optimism about career prospects dissipates among those who become trapped in temporary 
employment.  
 
Reciprocal interdependence   The seven extended apprentices interviewed had long-standing 
collaborative relationships with their professors, and one had acquired a ‘semi-autonomous’ 
status following the retirement of his professor. They had varied degree of involvement in their 
professors’ industrial projects at different stages of their careers.  They all share one common 
feature and that is pro-longed dependency on their professors’ for funding support and 
employment which inhibits their full transition to independent researchers. 
The extended apprentices generally reported having positive and trusting work relationships 
with their professors although recognizing that they were the ‘junior’ partners.  Over the years, 
the scope of their responsibility expanded from scientific bench research to cover a wide range of 
technical (e.g. grant application and writing) and non-technical (e.g. laboratory administration) 
support tasks in the laboratories. However, the interviews suggest that many can be described as 
‘helpers’ (Laudel and Gläser, 2008) in that they were mostly conducting dependent research and 
their main role being to support the work of their professors or other senior scientists.  Some 
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appear to be researchers-cum-administrators whose work role was rather ambiguous; others 
operated like highly-skilled laboratory technicians.  
They were compliant and willing to go an extra-mile to help their professors and work 
flexibly across different projects in return for collaborative opportunities and career support. For 
example, two of the postdocs who were publicly funded quite happily provided ‘free labour’ to 
work on their professors’ industrial projects. One stressed the ‘symbiotic relationship’ with his 
professor: 
 
‘I realised that, you know, he would be instrumental in allowing me that chance to develop 
so I’ve never felt restricted in any of my research whilst I’ve been doing it… I have a 
commitment to make sure I deliver on what we need to do, you know. And to be absolutely 
honest you’re often, hopefully, deliver far more than you’re asked to do’ (case 15). 
 
Another described himself as the ‘pseudo principal investigator’ on the industrial projects. He 
wrote the proposals, supervised the doctoral students and wrote the report while the professor 
remained as the formal principal investigator.  He reckoned that this was ‘quite good training 
because hopefully in the not too distant future I’ll be in a position of my own...’ (case 14). 
The professors also recognised the value of these experienced postdocs for sustaining their 
research capacity and had strong incentives to retain them: ‘… the continuity for us is good 
because we’ve had 10 years of this fellow, who is competent and had good skills’ (Professor I).  
Although they expressed concerns about the lack of long-term career prospects for the postdocs, 
many also felt obliged to get more grants to maintain the staff in their labs which appears to 
result in self-perpetuating cycles of mutual dependency:   
 
‘… you know, writing grant proposals and feeding the mouths that I had employed… there 
are a lot of people to keep… and that’s a feature of, you know you build up a research group 
and so on and it’s a feature of, you know it’s like having money, you know what you do with 
the money is you buy a big house and then you’ve got to get more money to pay the 
mortgage … (Professor C). 
 
 19
The extended apprentices were pessimistic about career prospects. Many pointed out that the 
applied and fragmented nature of their research, coupled with the short-duration of employment 
contracts, made it difficult for them to build up their own research profiles. Some felt that the 
long years of postdoctoral employment had significantly reduced their chance of obtaining 
tenured positions and closed alternative options. The following quotes are illustrative: 
‘...people doing maybe one, two or three postdocs and if they don’t have that tenured position 
by that stage, they may find themselves unemployable on the grounds that they cost too 
much…’ (case 15). 
‘…the expertise I have got isn’t sellable. I can’t go round – if you are a plumber or brickie or 
anything you have got – but if you are a scientist you can only work in science…’ (case 20). 
 
Transitional psychological contract and extended investment   The postdocs who have become 
trapped in short-term contracts experienced a ‘transitional’ psychological contract marked by a 
growing sense of uncertainty and erosion of expectations. However, they remained committed to 
academic research. With the exception of case 20 who was a former industrial scientist, all the 
others aspired to an academic career at the time of their doctoral training and this remained 
unchanged at the time of the interview. Although they had been involved in industrial projects 
and some reported having acquired additional project management skills, none saw employment 
in industry as an alternative option.  What is clear from the interviews is that their intrinsic 
interest in scientific research had not diminished over time. Many reported a high level of job 
satisfaction: 
 
‘I love my job. I enjoy being here and I think it is a good lab. I feel that – you know the sort 
of research that we do – you know trying to cure a devastating disease, it gives you a lot of 
drive’ (case 14). 
 
 ‘I’d be happy to commit my sort of medium term to University X you know, and yeah, I 
mean because I’m excited by the work that I do, you know professor H is a great colleague, a 
great collaborator…’ (case 15). 
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These postdocs have clearly developed strong affective and continuance commitment to their 
jobs. According to van Dam’s (2005) extended investment model, the likelihood of an employee 
sticking to a job is determined by both the present work situation and the anticipated future 
situation (alternative job, and loss of investments).  Postdocs who have academic career 
aspirations and invested heavily in scientific training may perceive the cost  of pursuing 
alternative options, both socio-emotional and material, to be too high. 
In the face of perceived poor career prospect, some of the extended apprentices responded by 
lowering their expectations. One, for example, was considering the option of a quasi-academic 
post as an administrator in a research laboratory: 
 
‘I am building my portfolio so I am trying to write as many papers as I can... And, you know, 
making sure that I get grants so that I have proof of external funding and things like that. So 
these will you know stand me in good stead for when I move on. Now the question is where 
to. Well because I am not entirely sure at the present stage and this is something that has 
dogged me for a few years really… The alternative would be building on my strength of sort 
of grant writing and sort of administrative roles which I have had forced upon me as it were 
over the last five years or so, so it would be perhaps like some sort of senior administrator 
role …’ (case 14). 
 
Those in their late careers concluded that they were unlikely to realise their intended career 
goals. They responded to the situation with ‘cynicism’ which reflects an apathy-based attitude, 
one that depicts resignation and weariness (Andersson 1996). For example, one of the extended 
apprentices who had been a contract researcher for over 20 years, responded to the question 
about the possibility of a permanent contract in a poignant manner: 
 
‘You could kick up a fuss and claim all sorts of legislation [concerning permanent 
employment] like that but then they would offer you the safety officers post’ (case 17). 
  
Others responded to the question about their career prospects with a sense of disillusionment and 
resignation: 
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‘I don’t want any grief. I just want to come in do the work, enjoy the work...So you know but 
it is not the way I planned it, it is just how it has come out’ (case 20). 
 
‘…you know, I wouldn’t recommend it to anybody but I’m content to be sad’ (case 15; 
emphasis added). 
 
While extended investment (van Dam, 2005) is an attempt to exert a degree of control over the 
exchange relationship under conditions of uncertainty, cynicism serves as a form of self-defence 
to cope with frustration and disillusionment (Naus et al., 2007).  Extended investment is a 
‘compromise’ form of adjustment for ameliorating losses and cynicism reflects ‘acquiescence’ 
whereby employees simply give up (Crites, 1969).  In both cases, actors adopt a reactive strategy 
for coping with career uncertainty which further reinforces their dependency. Career blockage 
and the absence of perceived alternatives mean that the extended apprentices have limited 
resources to influence the exchange in a perpetually unequal partnership in which they, the 
disadvantaged actors, must continue to give more in order to maintain the reciprocity of the more 
powerful partners, the professors.  
 
The ‘exploited apprentice’ in commercial engagement 
 
Negotiated dependence   These junior scientists had multiple roles both within and outside the 
research laboratories. They were student researchers and also employees or quasi-employees 
(without formal employment contracts) of their professors’ spin-off companies. Among the five 
cases studied, two were doctoral students part-funded by their professors’ spin-off companies 
(cases 9 and 10). In both cases, the thesis topics were closely defined by their professors at the 
outset which formed part of the research agenda of the spin-off companies.  Others were paid 
wages as contract researchers (cases 12, 13) to conduct relevant research for their professors’ 
commercial projects.  One publicly funded junior postdoc (case 11) worked alongside other 
privately funded researchers but without any additional compensation, apart from the promise of 
possible joint publications. In all but one of the cases, the industrial sponsors were the professors 
themselves who had dual roles as mentors and managers/business entrepreneurs. 
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The ambiguous boundary between ‘academic’ and ‘commercial’ research, and the 
multifaceted relationships between professors and student researchers generate conflict of 
interests and conflict of obligations of various kinds for the professors. Some professors 
expressed their concerns:  
  
‘I have two people working for [Company X] in my group and two people who are funded 
by a grant working on something else, but may be they kind of share resources or they share 
equipment. You know the complex is very hard to narrow down ...I have dreams about going 
to jail because of conflict of interests…’ (Professor F). 
 
‘Well … there was a time in which he [the student] was both my Co-Director and  an 
employee and a student, so I had a relationship with him at all of those levels and had to be 
very careful about making quite sure that that was dealt with appropriately…’ (Professor C). 
 
Others saw the overlap between academic and commercial research rather convenient for flexible 
utilisation of student researchers. For example, one professor who had employed a doctoral 
student to provide part-time technical support in his company, joked about the fact that the 
amount of time the student could be expected to spent on company activities could be ‘anything 
between 0-100%’ because of the co-location of the two activities.  
The interviews reveal ample evidence of what might be considered as ‘labour’ and 
‘intellectual’ exploitation of junior researchers much discussed in the ‘academic capitalism’ 
literature (Slaughter et al., 2002). Two aspects are particularly notable. The first relates to the 
multiple role demands and the heavy workload that ensued.   All the exploited apprentices 
interviewed reported excessively long working hours and having to perform a wide range of 
support tasks (e.g. patent search, building and testing prototypes and IT support) related to their 
professors’ commercial projects in addition to scientific bench work. For example, one doctoral 
student (case 9) reckoned that he was working at least 60 hours per week for the spin-off 
company in the final year of his study which delayed the completion of his thesis. Another junior 
postdoc (case 13) found himself having to provide technical support for all the IT equipments in 
the company: ‘I worked incredibly long hours and I used to run all the computers for them... I 
wasn’t paid to do that at all’. These support tasks substantially reduced their research time.  
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The second ‘exploitative’ aspect relates to research outputs, ownership of intellectual 
property and distribution of financial gains.  The classic problem of publication restriction was 
reported by all the interviewees who could not freely disseminate their research results until the 
patents were issued. None of them had the share of patent ownership generated from the research 
to which they had contributed. The two doctoral students had signed off any intellectual property 
that might generate from their research to the universities and spin-off companies which 
sponsored them.  Although patent ownership did not appear to be a major issue for these junior 
scientists, they were aware of the potential financial returns based on the collective research 
outputs. One junior postdoc (case 11), for example, talked about the ‘dollars’ that the professors 
were getting and was adamant that she was not offered any company shares despite the ‘extra 
work’ that she had to do for the company. The doctoral student, who co-founded a company with 
his doctoral supervisor and another professor, told one of the authors discreetly during the 
interview that the distribution of the company shares did not fairly reflect his contribution:  
 
‘... I would say that the equity stakes wasn’t entirely well set up. I mean, that information is 
confidential… Now, as it turns out for years this equity style does not reflect equal 
involvement with the company. Me, I am doing almost all of the work. Professor C 
contributed a little bit but Professor Y was so busy with his other interests that he had time to 
contribute with nothing. So I wouldn’t say that the structure is very equitable anymore... You 
know, so I would personally not enter a deal like this again’ (case 9). 
 
Perceived unequal exchange may prompt the development of a more vigilant and transactional 
attitude (Morrison and Robinson, 1997). There is evidence of a quid pro quo mentality 
developing among some of the exploited apprentices. The aforementioned doctoral student (case 
9), for example, negotiated for the position of ‘technical director’ in the spin-off company in 
return for overseeing the technical side of the business.  The junior postdoc (case 11), also 
quoted above, subtly voiced her discontent by pointing out to the professors that it was not 
within her contractual terms to work for the spin-off company. These incidents suggest that 
conflict and tension may be lurking behind the cooperative relationship. However, in an unequal 
dependent relationship, the weaker actors cannot afford to adopt too tough a stance with their 
stronger partners because they are more likely to lose out if they do so. The ‘exploited 
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apprentices’ may display occasional discontent but were mindful of not causing any overt 
tension or conflict.  
 
Balanced psychological contract   The ‘balanced’ psychological contract, a hybrid type 
consisting of both relational and transactional elements, best describes the exploited apprentices’ 
expectations and perceptions of obligations. Despite the apparent ‘exploitation’, they reported 
positive work relationships with their professors. It appears that any perceived unfair exchange in 
the commercial relationship was offset by the learning opportunities and mentoring support 
provided by the entrepreneurial professors. The exploited apprentices emphasised their positive 
learning experience and believed that the commercial expertise acquired would be beneficial for 
their future careers. The following quote is illustrative: 
 
‘Yeah, I learned, I learned, I mean everything I did was useful and I learned something from 
it. Consulting-wise you learn a lot of people skills, corporate politics, all that stuff. On the 
business side, you learn a lot about structuring contracts and deals and licensing and 
intellectual property. Everything around that…Well, the equity side is not necessarily the 
most important side to me anyway, because I think I wouldn’t have learned about companies 
without this. I would like to do it again, the experience and contacts are worth more in the 
long term’ (case 9). 
 
It is also notable that these young scientists have picked up their professors’ entrepreneurial 
career imprints as a result of the close working relationships and exposure to commercial 
ventures. Although they did not have fixed career preferences at the time they started their 
doctoral studies, an academic career was what they had initially expected.   However, they 
pointed out that having worked on the commercial projects, they would now consider an 
industrial or a hybrid career bridging science and business. This change in career preference 
reflects what some authors refer to as ‘social influence effect’ (Azoulay et al 2009). Conducting 
applied and commercially-oriented research during the formative years of young scientists’ 
careers can significantly influence their motivation and academic identity (Hakala, 2009). The 
narratives in the interviews show the formation of an entrepreneurial orientation among the 
exploited apprentices. They shared a common view that research should be ‘useful’ and 
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‘practical’ in order to be worthwhile, and that ‘commercialization is good and sensible’, to put it 
in the words of one junior postdoc (case 11). 
If these junior scientists were considering commercial careers as a possible option, then the 
benefits of undertaking training in a commercial environment would seem to outweigh the 
scientific risks entailed.  Moreover, performing additional duties in their professors’ spin-off 
companies and taking on various external business liaison roles could be instrumental for their 
career development. As pointed out by an astute doctoral student: ‘You know as soon as you’re 
introduced to contacts, and they are your contacts, you can then use them to your own career, 
right’ (case 9). Thus, what may seem like ‘exploitation’ to an outsider could be seen as an 
‘investment’ for advancing one’s own career future.  
 
The ‘runaway apprentice’ in commercial engagement 
 
The intention of these young scientists to quit academia became more apparent as they continued 
to involve in their professors’ commercial activities. Over time, the relationships shifted from 
negotiated dependence to negotiated interdependence as the postdocs accumulated experience 
and became more powerful employees. Conflicts over fairness of exchange frequently occurred 
and the postdocs gradually experienced a transactional turn in their psychological contracts. 
Growing realisation that the academic career might be closed to them eventually prompts them to 
look for alternative career options.  
 
Negotiated interdependence   The four cases interviewed had worked with their professors for 
over 10 years, including two who co-founded spin-off companies with their professors (Case 21 
and 23). Three were still working with their professors at the time of the interview but had little 
intention of staying. One had gained independence by obtaining a five-year personal fellowship 
(case 24). They all reported strong influence of the professors on their research and career 
progress over the years.  For example, one indicated that his doctoral research topic was ‘written 
up as a paragraph’ by his supervisor which subsequently became part of the research leading to a 
spin-off company. The same postdoc declared, with a sense of resentment, how his ‘life was 
changed unalterably by interacting with this person [the professor]’ (Case 23). He then went on 
to explain how his professor ‘prevented’ him from entering the pharmaceutical industry after his 
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PhD which was his ‘big goal’ at the time, and how he was persuaded to take on three successive 
postdoc contracts with the promise of an academic career: 
 
‘...I found myself in the position where I was doing a postdoctoral appointment with my ex-
PhD supervisor…A three year postdoc, so I was coming to the end of this and I think it was 
his hope that I would, because again, once again, it was a very successful three years and I 
think he was hoping that I would take on another three years with him … But I wasn’t 
interested in that, I felt that I had been cornered… And I was going to become 
unemployed…’ (case 23). 
 
Other postdocs told similar stories about how their careers had become intertwined with their 
professors’ commercial ventures. For example, cases 21 and 22 followed their professors’ job 
moves to the present institutions for project and employment continuity. The interviews suggest 
that professors who are heavily engaged in commercialization need experienced postdocs not 
only for resolving the ‘time squeeze’ problem, but also for risk sharing. Company formation is a 
high risk activity. Some of the professors sought to reduce personal risks by delegating the key 
commercial responsibilities to the senior postdocs.   One of the professors, for instance, stated in 
the interview that he was ‘fighting not to be a director’ at the time when the company was set up 
because he felt that he was ‘wearing two hats at all stages’ (Professor F).  In the end, the main 
coordinating role was taken up by the postdoc (case 23) who saw the spin-off company as an 
opportunity for acquiring new experience. In addition to managing commercial projects, the 
postdocs also played a central role in coordinating the research in the academic laboratories. 
Thus, the professors become heavily dependent on the postdocs as research collaborators as well 
as business partners.  
Over the years, there was an instrumental shift in the relationship as the interface between 
the two parties became more dominated by commercial activities.  Open exchange relationships 
gradually developed into more restricted and negotiated arrangements. The interviews reveal 
three factors underlying this shift.  The first is that the postdocs had become more ‘powerful’ 
employees and sought greater recognition for their contributions as they acquired technical 
expertise and entrepreneurial acumen. The three postdocs who remained in the relationships at 
the time of interview believed that their contributions to the work of their professors far 
 27
outweighed the benefits that they had received. A sense of injustice and unfairness permeated the 
conversations in the interviews. One of the postdocs expressed his anger and frustration over the 
unequal exchange:  
 
‘You know he has benefited more from me than I have from him, Definitely…Well he has 
got two strands to his research group, bio responsive polymers and everything else, and the 
bio responsive polymers count for over half of his research but done by me. And one of the 
reasons that I was looking to get out of university…I mean this is true I would say of every 
post doc that they have been undervalued, under appreciated, certainly underpaid… if you 
are not very careful about it then you end up losing out…’ (case 21). 
 
Another talked about the competitive tension in the relationship with his professor as he sought a 
more equal partnership: 
 
‘I think he had a vision of me as being somebody whose role was to provide him with 
support. And to begin with that was fine, because that was what I did… But I got to the point 
where I wanted to stand on my own two feet...to have my own networks and grant writing, 
and he found that very, very difficult… He wanted to keep me as a support and I wanted to 
build myself up and build my own pyramid’ (case 22). 
 
A second factor which triggers an instrumental turn in the relationship is the frequency of 
disputes over the share of financial rewards. For example, one of the postdocs whose relationship 
with his professors was clearly under great strain, talked about how he was ‘ripped off’ by his 
professors over the consultancy work and the dramatic deterioration of their relationship: 
  
‘He is a user basically … Well yes, and he thinks he is doing you favours… But on the other 
side on the consultancy work that we do with Company X for example, you know the 
amount of money that he actually pays me compared to what we are actually getting for the 
contract it just – you know it is totally opposite to that…It was a good relationship up until 
the Company X situation and then he basically ripped me off big time and that really 
probably destroyed eight years of a good relationship’ (Case 21). 
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Finally, the realisation that the academic career path might be closed to them further fuels the 
tension. Commercial engagement diverts their time and resources away from publication. It is 
evident from the interviews that intense commercial engagement hinders scientific outputs due to 
the time constraints and secrecy problems: 
 
‘I would rather have three or four times as many papers as I have got – those I have – but 
because of the confidentiality issues then that is just not possible...’ 
 (case 21). 
 
‘...as soon as there is patenting issue, then immediately there are time constraints... the 
publication was delayed and the quality of the paper suffered because we compromised what 
we wanted to say...’ (case 22). 
 
Having worked hard on their professors’ commercial projects and compromised their own 
research, the realisation that their contributions might not be rewarded in career terms arouses 
feelings of injustice and betrayal: ‘…there has been very little interest in this department in 
terms of, you know, advancing my career. In fact there is none. They have actively blocked it…’ 
(case 21). This quote is indicative of the emotion of anger and outrage associated with 
psychological contract violation (Robinson and Rousseau 2004).  
  
Transactional psychological contract and career crafting   Psychological contract theory 
suggests that violation of psychological contract involves not only attitudinal reactions, but also a 
readiness for action (Morrison and Robinson 1997). Postdocs who believed that their professors 
had failed to meet their obligations and found the option of an academic career closed sought 
remedial action to compensate for their losses. The transactional turn in their psychological 
contracts ultimately triggers their desire to exit the relationship.  
The three postdocs who remained in the relationships at the time of the study were all 
planning their ‘escape routes’. One declared that he no longer wanted an academic career after 
several unsuccessful applications for a tenured position. This prompted him to channel his effort 
into the spin-off company as an avenue for future employment (case 21). Another actively 
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pursued consultancy to build his ‘portfolio’career (case 22).  The third postdoc (case 23), who 
felt that he had been ‘cornered’ by his professor to take on one postdoc after another, said, ‘I 
can’t be trapped in that way…I would even ruin myself in order to escape’. He subsequently 
negotiated a ‘special deal’ with his department which enabled him to be on half-time secondment 
to the spin-off company for a period while retaining his research position in the university. 
These examples illustrate the active role of the runaways in shaping their jobs and careers in 
order to reduce uncertainty and assert autonomy. Unlike the extended apprentices who remain 
committed to an academic career, the runaways’ intention to pursue a pure academic career has 
diminished over time and they regard a hybrid or entrepreneurial career as a viable and even 
more appealing option. Although commercial engagement has constrained their scientific 
training, it also provides them with the opportunities to redefine the boundary of their jobs and 
acquire the necessary expertise for pursuing an entrepreneurial career.  Changing task boundaries 
is a form of career crafting which can be used as a means of acquiring new skills (Wrzesniewski 
and Dutton, 2001). One common strategy used by the postdocs was to manage their role 
transition by gradually reducing the amount of bench work and allocate more time and effort to 
managerial tasks: 
 
‘Well I decreased the amount of actual lab work that I do. And I am pretty much supervising 
the lab. I do, yes, a little bit of lab work but I am trying to get away from that… I want to 
manage a company and run a company...’ (case 21).  
 
Some used influence tactics to initiate role transition at a critical juncture. One postdoc recounted 
how he went about crafting his own job by setting up a translational research unit: 
 
‘...you know, you just write your own job description, just write exactly what you’d like to 
do and then take it to somebody and convince them that they really want somebody like that, 
is a much better way to go about getting a job than just looking for one that somebody else 
has decided what they want…’ (case 24). 
 
Compared with those engaged in collaborative research, postdocs engaged in commercial 
ventures perceive more opportunities and are more motivated to engage in career crafting. They 
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operate at the boundaries between science and business, away from the centre of attention of 
their academic peers, and thus experience greater latitude in their day-to-day work. The same 
postdoc quoted above, for example, pointed out that his ‘constantly moving mirage of activities’ 
had generated ‘some mystique’ in his department and ‘so not surprisingly the majority of my 
colleagues only know snippets of what I do and how I manage it and everything else…’ (case 
24). Role ambiguity appears to have given him much scope for crafting his career within and 
outside the academic laboratories. This postdoc set up several spin-off and consultancy 
companies in parallel with his academic post.  
Further, the belief that the academic career path might be blocked adds to the incentive for 
career crafting. The runaway apprentices actively pursued self-directed learning so as to 
accumulate the necessary human and social capital for pursuing an entrepreneurial career.  
Setting up spin-off companies, which was seen initially as a means of off-setting employment 
insecurity had subsequently became the focus of sustained learning and career building: 
   
‘Of all of us I think I’m the one who takes Company X the most seriously. I’ve probably 
gone to more of the meetings with third parties and handled more of the potential business 
and more of the writing than any of the others… so like it’s my goal to learn as much as 
possible during this very lucky period...I have now got a lot of skills to do with 
entrepreneurialism per se, so that’s good...’ (case 23). 
 
‘I am basically running that company…So I have done a lot of networking. The Enterprise 
Fellowship was based up in Scotland so it was a flight to Scotland a couple of times a month 
to do MBA modules and things like that, build up some networks up there, down in London, 
going to conferences, talking to people...’ (case 21). 
 
The runaway apprentices are ‘entrepreneurial bricoleurs’ (Baker and Nelson, 2005) and ‘career 
crafters’ (Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001). They seek to take charge of their own careers by 
making use of available resources in a constrained environment to open up options. While 
seeking to break away from the academic bond with their professors, they actively exploit their 
existing relational resources for developing their parallel entrepreneurial careers.  All but one 
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subsequently left their postdoctoral positions to pursue careers in start-ups but maintained their 
academic ties in one way or another.  
 
Career transitions and trajectories: ‘content to be sad’ or ‘runaway apprentice’ 
 
The contrast between the career experience of young scientists engaged in collaborative research 
and commercial ventures is striking. This is reflected in their subsequent career trajectories 
(Figure 2). The great majority of those who had been involved in collaborative research 
remained in academia whereas all but two of those engaged in commercial ventures sought 
employment outside academia. Among the 15 collaborative cases, four obtained permanent 
academic positions after their initial postdoctoral appointments (standard academic track), seven 
remained as contract researchers (slow/trapped academic track)4, two progressed from students 
to junior postdocs and two left for employment elsewhere.  Among the 9 cases in the commercial 
category, seven subsequently pursued careers in private firms including six in start-ups and one 
in a large established firm, two remained in academia as contract researchers. The divergent 
career paths suggest that the influence of collaborative research on the careers of young scientists 
is ambiguous, with some progressing to permanent academic positions and others trapped in 
temporary employment. The effect of commercial engagement, however, is clear and consistent: 
it closes the academic career for the majority and shifts their employment towards start-ups or 
private industry.  
The interviews suggest that collaborative research can benefit young scientists when the 
projects undertaken are aligned with their research and training needs. These learner apprentices 
generally reported positive learning experiences, and four out of eight of them obtained 
permanent positions following the standard academic track. However, collaborative research has 
limited training value when young scientists are deployed in an instrumental manner, and 
prolonged engagement hampers their scientific development. This is borne out by the experience 
of the extended apprentices who found it difficult to make the transition from dependent to 
independent researchers. The adverse effects of industrial engagement on the academic careers 
of young scientists are most apparent among those involved in commercial ventures. Unlike their 
professors who adapt their secure careers to the dual roles of scientist-entrepreneurs, young 
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scientists have limited resources and often ended up jeopardising their academic careers when 
they seek to combine science and business.  
The contrasted career trajectories reflect not only the different resource constraints and 
opportunities associated with the two types of activities but are also outcomes of young 
scientists’ adaptive strategies. Both the ‘extended’ and ‘runaway’ apprentices experience the 
frustration of unfulfilled expectations but responded differently. The former adopt a compromise 
approach through extended investment whereas the latter pursue a proactive strategy through 
career crafting. The divergent exchange relationships with their professors affect their 
psychological contracts and subsequent adaptive behaviours. 
Our analysis shows that collaborative research reinforces the reciprocal mentoring exchange 
between professors and young scientists. However, the extended apprentices became trapped in a 
self-perpetuating cycle of increased mutual dependency with their professors. Their ‘entrapment’ 
is further reinforced by the commitment to academic research which they have developed over 
time. While young scientists may differ in their initial career preferences, their academic career 
aspirations can be strengthened or weakened as a result of early career socialisation. 
Collaborative research with industry may lead to more open attitudes towards career options 
among some of the young scientists but it does not appear to erode the appeal of an academic 
career for the majority. For those who progress to postdocs, their academic career aspiration is 
strengthened and they may consider the cost of pursuing alternative career options too high. 
Brockener (1992) argues that loss aversion and uncertainty surrounding goal attainment may 
prompt actors to persist with failing courses of action in the hope of attaining some of their goals. 
In the absence of perceived alternatives, the extended apprentices responded to unfulfilled 
aspirations by lowering their expectations and sought to reduce uncertainty through extended 
investment. The interview quote, ‘I am content to be sad’ (case 15), depicts acquiescence and 
resignation of those trapped in temporary employment. 
Commercial engagement, in contrast, adds a transactional element to the relationship 
between professors and young scientists, and generates conflict. The intention of the young 
scientists to ‘run away’ reflects considerable strain, and in some cases, a breakdown in the 
relationship.  The experience of psychological contract violation further spurs an instrumental 
turn in their attitudes and behaviours. The runaway apprentices sought to compensate for losses 
by redefining their roles and relationships with the professors. They actively pursued 
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entrepreneurial learning so as to enhance their employability outside academia. Involvement in 
commercial ventures also shifts their career preferences away from academia towards start-ups 
or private industry which enables them to see the possibilities of alternative options. This further 
stimulates their motivation for career crafting. Unlike the extended apprentices whose action and 
cognitive reappraisal are avoidant in nature, the runaway apprentices display personal agency in 
managing their careers. The following interview quote well captures the take-charge mentality:  
‘...I don’t have any worries about jobs now because I will be able to do something’ (case 21). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between the psychological 
contract and individuals’ career behaviour. Whereas the mainstream theory argues that 
unfulfilled career expectations or psychological contract breach leads to scaling down of 
employee contribution and withdrawal behaviour (Coyle-Shapiro and Kessler, 2000; Robinson, 
1996), our findings present a more diverse picture. The extended apprentices responded to unmet 
expectations by ‘scaling up’ their contributions through extended investment. The runaway 
apprentices did not just exit the relationship but sought to craft new jobs and careers by drawing 
value from existing relationships. Both categories seek to influence the exchange relationships 
with their professors, albeit under different constraints and possibilities. Our analysis suggests 
that individuals are capable of exercising agency, to a greater or lesser degree, by taking actions 
to shape their careers. This is so even among those who are apparently lacking in power and 
resources as illustrated by the young scientists in unequal dependency relationships with their 
professors. 
The study also sheds new light on the contemporary debate about the changing nature of 
academic careers.  A significant development in the last decade is the increased use of young 
scientists as contract researchers in a two-tiered structure which has hindered their upward 
mobility and eroded the dominant career expectations institutionalised in the university system. 
The extension of the ‘apprenticeship’ career ladder by a sequence of temporary posts reflects the 
growth of what Marsden (2010) refers to as ‘extended entry tournaments’  in academia, where 
some become trapped in the low status positions of their preferred profession. Much of the 
existing literature has highlighted the plight of the ‘trapped postdocs’ and portrays young 
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scientists as victims of the new knowledge production regime. The experience of the ‘extended 
apprentices’ clearly illustrates the vulnerability of these pre-tenured researchers. 
However, our analysis also indicates that the career trajectories of young scientists have 
become much more diverse and fluid than recognised in the literature. Young scientists are not 
just resources for the entrepreneurial efforts of their professors or universities, but are active 
agents in promoting the new knowledge regime. The transition of the ‘runways’ towards 
entrepreneurial start-ups is a case in point. They actively exploit boundary-crossing learning 
opportunities and network resources to develop ‘hybrid’ careers at the intersection of science and 
business. Survey evidence in the UK and also elsewhere (Lee, 2011; Stephan et al., 2004) shows 
a growing trend of science and engineering doctorates employed in private industry. A common 
assumption is that they seek employment in large established firms.  Our analysis suggests that 
beyond the choice between either academia or industry, the confluence of two previously 
separate organizational fields has led to the emergence of new career opportunities in 
entrepreneurial start-ups.  These organizations provide career options different from those in 
R&D in large established firms because they have academic roots and offer young scientists 
more intellectual challenge as well as opportunities to maintain academic network ties (Roach 
and Sauermann, 2010). They are, in part, the product of young scientists’ efforts to realign the 
boundary of their work and careers with the commercial learning and career aspirations which 
they have acquired over the course of their ‘apprenticeships’ with the entrepreneurial professors. 
The transformation of universities into entrepreneurial organizations has expanded the 
institutional context in which academic careers develop and unfold. The emergence of new 
career trajectories does not merely reflect the limited possibilities offered by traditional academic 
careers. It is also due partly to the efforts of young scientists to redefine their professional roles 
and careers in response to the boundary-crossing opportunities created by the entrepreneurial 
university. As Inkson et al note (2012: : 313), ‘boundaries are social creations and career actors 
help create them’. Career boundaries can constrain role perceptions and career choices as in the 
case of the extended apprentices, but they also enable boundary crossing activities as illustrated 
by the entrepreneurial behaviours of the runaway apprentices. Another important insight gained 
from this study is that the conventional debate about whether academic careers have become 
more ‘bounded’ or ‘boundaryless’ (Dany et al., 2011; Baruch and Hall, 2004; Kaulisch and 
Enders, 2005) misses an important point in that the processes underlying the two are closely 
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intertwined.  The entrepreneurial university has strengthened organizational control over 
academic careers. At the same time, it has also created a ‘free’ social space spanning academia 
and industry which facilitates the development of network careers between the two sectors (Lam, 
2007).  
University scientists are archetypal professional knowledge workers operating in a sector 
where the pressures for greater organizational flexibility and growth of contingent work have 
profound implications for career progression and labour market entry. Similar trends can be 
observed in other knowledge-intensive sectors (Marsden 2010). This paper has highlighted the 
value of studying academic careers for understanding the impact of these developments on the 
psychological contract and career behaviour of individuals. The general theoretical insights 
gained from this study, therefore, have wider relevance. However, a number of qualifications 
should be noted. First, university academics enjoy considerable freedom in their work even 
among those in low status positions. Thus, the scope for exercising agency and asserting control 
over the task and relational boundary of their work is likely to be greater than that experienced 
by knowledge workers in other sectors. In the absence of freedom to act, the capacity of 
individuals to proactively manage their careers will be minimised.  Second, the study was 
conducted in the scientific fields where the research goals of academia and industry increasingly 
overlap with increased cross-sector opportunities for career mobility. The same kind of 
opportunity may not exist in the fields where the relationship between the two sectors is more 
distant. Finally, the analysis is based on the experience of academic scientists in major research 
universities and the findings may not be typical of those working in a more constraining 
environment. 
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Table 1 The interviewees: distribution by position and industrial engagement 
 
 Collaborative 
 
Commercial  Total no. 
Professor 
 
 
5 11 16 
Senior post-doc 
  
 
7 4 11 
Doctoral 
student/junior post-
doc  
8 
 
5 
 
13 
 
Total no. 
 
 
20 20 40 
 37
Table 2  Interviewee profile 
 
Students/ 
Postdocs 
Case no. 
Academic 
position 
Discipline Age 
group 
Employment status 
(duration and no. of 
contracts) 
Mode of industrial 
engagement 
Corresponding 
professor/industrial 
engagement  
(Case code) 
1  Doctoral 
Student 
Biosciences 25-30 Student  Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial (A)  
2  Junior 
postdoc 
Biosciences 31-35 Contract researcher 
7 yrs (3 contracts) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial  (B) 
3  Doctoral 
Student 
Computer 
science 
25-30 Student 
 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial  
(not interviewed) 
4  Doctoral 
Student 
Computer 
science 
<25 Student Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial  (D) 
5 Junior 
postdoc 
Computer 
science 
25-30 Contract researcher 
3 yrs (1 contract) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial  (D) 
6 Doctoral 
student 
Chemistry 25-30 Student 
 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial (G) 
7 Junior 
postdoc 
Physics 25-30 Contract researcher 
2 yrs (1 contract) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial (G) 
8 Junior 
postdoc 
Engineering 31-35 Contract researcher 
6  yrs (2 contracts) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative (L) 
9 Doctoral 
student 
Computer 
science  
<25 Student /employee 
 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial  (C) 
10  Doctoral 
student 
Physics 25-30 Student/employee 
 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial (E) 
11  Junior 
postdoc 
Biosciences 31-35 Contract researcher 
3 yrs (1 contract) 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
(F) 
12.  Junior 
postdoc 
Chemistry 31-35 Contract researcher 
4 yrs (2 contracts) 
 
Commercial Collaborative + 
commercial (G) 
13   Junior 
postdoc 
Physics 36-40 6 yrs  
(2 contracts) 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
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14.  Senior 
postdoc 
Biosciences 36-40  Contract researcher  
 15+ yrs (numerous 
contracts) 
 
Collaborative  Collaborative (H) 
15.  Senior 
postdoc 
Biosciences 36-40  Contract researcher 
 10+ yrs (6 contracts) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative (H) 
16 Senior 
postdoc 
Biosciences 40+ Contract researcher 
17 yrs (5 contracts) 
 
Collaborative Collaborative (I) 
17 Senior 
postdoc 
 
Engineering 
/Physics 
40+ 
 
Contract researcher 
23 yrs (numerous 
contracts) 
Collaborative Collaborative 
(not interviewed) 
18 Senior 
postdoc 
 
Chemistry 36-40 Contract researcher 
15+ yrs (numerous 
contracts 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial (G) 
19 
 
Senior 
postdoc 
 
Biomedicine 40+  Contract researcher 
18 yrs (5 contracts) 
Collaborative Collaborative/ 
commercial (K) 
20  Senior 
postdoc 
 
Biosciences 50+ Contract researcher 
10 yrs ( 20+ yrs as 
industrial researcher) 
Collaborative Collaborative + 
commercial (A) 
21 Senior 
postdoc 
 
Chemical 
engineering   
31-35 Contract researcher 
10 yrs (5 contracts)  
 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
(Not interviewed) 
22 Senior 
postdoc 
 
Biosciences 36-40 Contract researcher 
14 yrs (5 contracts) 
 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
(M) 
23 Senior 
postdoc 
 
Biosciences 36-40 Contract researcher 
10 yrs (3 contracts)  
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
(F) 
24. Senior 
postdoc 
Biomedicine 36-40 Contract researcher 
14 yrs (numerous 
contracts) 
Commercial Collaborative/ 
commercial 
(Not interviewed) 
Total no. of 
students/ 
postdocs 
interviewed= 
24 
     Total no. of professors 
interviewed = 16* 
*13 out of the 16 professors were supervisors of the students/postdocs interviewed; 3 were in similar roles but not directly linked to the students/postdocs. 
 39
Figure 1  Four categories of young scientists 
 
  
 
Modes of industrial 
engagement \ Nature 
of involvement 
Training 
(Students/junior postdocs) 
Work 
(Senior postdocs) 
 
Collaborative 
(Diffuse/relational 
exchange) 
 
‘Learner apprentice’ 
(Cases 1-8) 
 
Reciprocal dependence  
 
Relational PC  
 
 
‘Extended apprentice’ 
(Cases 14-20) 
 
Reciprocal interdependence  
 
Transitional PC  
 
Commercial 
(Restricted/negotiated 
exchange) 
 
 
‘Exploited apprentice’ 
(Cases 9-13) 
 
Negotiated dependence;  
  
Balanced PC 
 
 
‘Run away apprentice’ 
(Cases 21-24) 
 
Negotiated interdependence;  
 
Transactional PC  
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Academic   
trapped (7) 
 
Start-ups (3) 
Junior 
postdoc 
Senior 
postdoc 
(1) 
Industry/ 
other (2) 
(2) 
(1) 
Academic  
tenured (4) 
 
Start-ups (3)  
/large firm (1) 
Collaborative research 
(15 cases) 
Commercial 
engagement 
 (9 cases) 
Doctoral 
student 
Figure two   Career transitions and destinations  
 
Note: figures in brackets show the number of cases 
 
 
“Content to 
be sad” “Runaways” 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 According to the Royal Society Report (2010), in the UK, 30 percent of science PhD graduates go on to 
postdoctoral positions, but only around 4 percent obtained permanent academic posts. 
2This term has been used by Hamilton (1995)  to refer to trainees who ran away from their masters in late 
18th century North America which subsequently led to the breakdown of apprenticeship there. 
3
 The distinction between training and employment is not always crisp as doctoral students are increasingly 
paid to work as student-employees and junior postdocs are in transition from training to work. For 
analytical purposes, the doctoral students and junior postdocs are placed in the ‘training’ category whereas 
the senior postdocs are put under the ‘employment’ category. 
4
 Two senior postdocs subsequently obtained tenure posts after nearly 20 years’ in temporary employment 
as contract researchers. 
